Eisenhower and Cambodia by Rust William J.;

Author:Rust, William J.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
Published: 2016-05-26T04:00:00+00:00

9

“Stupid Moves”

(1959–1960)

It took four weeks to produce President Eisenhower’s seven-hundred-word reply to Sihanouk’s appeal in late February 1959 for US intervention with South Vietnam and Thailand. Early in the drafting process, the State Department instructed ambassadors Elbridge Durbrow and U. Alexis Johnson to obtain conciliatory statements from their host governments. The diplomats should explain that the United States wanted to document its consultation with South Vietnam and Thailand and to include their declarations in the president’s response to Sihanouk. Department officials hoped that the statements from Saigon and Bangkok would express respect for Cambodian independence and neutrality and show a willingness to cooperate in strengthening friendly relations with the kingdom: “[The] value of [the] statements would be seriously diminished by [the] inclusion [of] contentious reservations or remarks.” Durbrow and Johnson were advised to provide assurances that Eisenhower’s letter would not “indicate acceptance of Cambodian charges against Thailand and Viet-Nam.”1

The initial reactions from the two ambassadors were equivocal, at best. On March 6, Johnson cabled that it would be “difficult” for him to ask for another statement from Thai officials, who had already denied furnishing arms to Cambodian dissidents. He also pointed out that the “strength” of the Thai statement would depend on the degree to which the letter to Sihanouk addressed Thailand’s “legitimate concerns” about Cambodia’s foreign policy.2

In Saigon, Durbrow foresaw difficulty in obtaining a conciliatory statement from Ngo Dinh Diem: “I fear in his present mood (he has been extremely cool bordering on anger toward me during last three interviews) it might be difficult, if not impossible, [to] obtain [a] favorable statement. With Dap Chhuon’s death, which ends all hope for [the] change Diem desired, he [is] probably in [an] angrier mood today and even less amenable to suggestion.” In a subsequent telegram, Durbrow noted an improvement in Diem’s temper but was discouraged to report that “recent events have failed to budge him an inch from his well-known position that ‘you cannot do business with Sihanouk.’”3

On March 7, Durbrow handed Diem a seemingly innocuous two-sentence draft statement: “The Government of Viet-Nam recognizes that internal disorder and instability in any free nation, including Cambodia, prejudices [the] interests of the free world and serves only the interests of international communism. The Government of Viet-Nam respects the independence and integrity of the Royal Khmer Government, and is prepared to cooperate with it in strengthening friendly relations on a basis of mutual respect and good will.”4

Upon reflection—and after a conversation with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu—Diem found both the form and the substance of the proposed statement unsatisfactory. He thought it “rather extraordinary” that the president of the United States would make a declaration on behalf of South Vietnam. The communists, he argued, could use the US consultations with South Vietnam and Thailand as proof that the two countries were American “satellites.” In Diem’s view, the statement falsely implied that South Vietnam had the military ability to threaten the independence of Cambodia, that Sihanouk was “really afraid of Viet-Nam,” and that Cambodia was “incapable of doing harm to Viet-Nam.

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